Crisis lessons from the Post Office Fujitsu crisis

It’s a tragedy that the ongoing Post Office scandal that has been reported in Great Britain for more than a decade only became front page news after a television dramatisation of the events that have devastated the lives of hundreds of postmasters.

To recap, the Post Office launched a new computer system, Horizon, which was run by global technology giants, Fujitsu.

There were significant problems with the software, which recorded inaccurate financial data and ended up with hundreds of sub-postmasters being wrongly accused of theft, fraud and false accounting which saw many of them lose their homes, their livelihoods and in some cases, their freedom.

The Post Office told each of those postmasters facing problems that they were an isolated case, pursuing them through civil and criminal courts despite there clearly being a pattern to the problems.

The Post Office has slumped from being one of Britain’s most trusted brands to an organisation now so steeped in deceit and reputational damage that it’s unlikely to ever fully recover.

Such was the extent of the cover-up that senior management at the Post Office and Fujitsu hired lawyers and investigators to help protect them, manipulating evidence that could have resolved the problem without ruining people’s lives.

There were so many opportunities to do the right thing – but self-serving executives did everything in their power to kill the story. The very volume of those affected made it almost impossible for the story to stay hidden, even if it took a drama to bring it to the public consciousness.

But as with all scandals, there are lessons that organisations can learn. Not every brand has the good will that the Post Office had, and that makes them more vulnerable to collapse.

Here are five PR lessons that organisations can learn from the scandal:

Be transparent and accountable

• The Post Office failed to acknowledge the problems with the Horizon system, and instead tried to cover them up and blame the sub-postmasters for the discrepancies

• Where was the leadership at the Post Office and Fujitsu to take responsibility, ensure the respective organisations took the right path and look to address rather than double down when the problems arose?

• They also withheld and manipulated crucial evidence that could have exonerated the sub-postmasters, and tried to suppress and discredit whistleblowers and journalists who tried to expose the truth, sending intimidating letters and legal warnings

• The courts later found that the Horizon system was “not remotely robust” and that the Post Office had engaged in “institutional obstinacy or refusal to consider any possible alternatives to their view of Horizon”. The court also criticised the Post Office’s “culture of secrecy and excessive confidentiality”, and its “oppressive behaviour” towards the postmasters

Be empathetic and compassionate

• The Post Office showed a lack of empathy and compassion for the sub-postmasters, many of whom had worked loyally for them for decades

• The employees were subjected to harassment and intimidation by its legal team and private investigators rather than listening to their concerns and complaints

• They should have also apologised and compensated the sub-postmasters as soon as the problems were identified, instead of dragging them through lengthy and costly legal battles

Be honest and consistent

• The Post Office lied and contradicted itself about the reliability and security of the Horizon system, and about its role and responsibility in the prosecutions 

• The Post Office claimed that the Horizon system was robust and accurate, and that the sub-postmasters were the only ones responsible for their accounts, despite evidence of bugs, glitches and errors in the system, and the possibility of remote access and alterations by Fujitsu staff

• There were even reports that the head of PR and media for the Post Office helped write a story defending the faulty Horizon system that was added to prosecution witness statements, a huge betrayal of the honesty and integrity code that all communicators should abide by

• The Post Office also claimed that it had no influence or involvement in the prosecutions, despite evidence of its close collaboration and coordination with the prosecutors, and its interference and influence in the legal proceedings

Be proactive and responsive 

• The Post Office was reactive and defensive in its PR strategy, failing to address and resolve the issues with the Horizon system and the prosecutions in a timely and effective manner 

• It only responded to the crisis when it was forced to by scrutiny such as legal challenges by the sub-postmasters; the media investigations by BBC’s Panorama and Computer Weekly; and Parliamentary inquiries

• The Post Office should have taken the lead to identify and fix the Horizon system problems rather than let it all play out. Doing so simply showed them to be complicit in one of Britain’s biggest ever miscarriages of justice

Be ethical

• The Post Office violated the principles and standards of professional conduct and social responsibility, using its extensive legal and communications resources to silence and discredit its critics and victims, and to protect its own interests and reputation, at the expense of the truth and justice

• If you seek to defend your reputation even in the face of overwhelming evidence, it undermines not only your credibility but also that of those connected with you and your organisation

• The fact that a former Post Office investigator refused to accept a postmaster was innocent after a court overturned his conviction speaks volumes; and had to be legally compelled to attend the government inquiry, shows how deeply the problems are rooted

Since the scandal emerged, the Post Office has belatedly apologised and admitted that it “got things wrong” which resulted in £58m in compensation so far and the quashing of 86 wrongful convictions.

Fujitsu’s European chief Paul Patterson belatedly said that it has "clearly let society down, and the sub-postmasters down" for its role, and that there were "bugs, errors and defects" with the Horizon software "right from the very start” having known about bugs as early as 1999.

How much compensation they will donate to those who have suffered remains to be seen.

The scandal is a shocking example of how a powerful institution can abuse its position and authority and use its legal and communications resources to ill effect, to silence and discredit its critics and victims rather than address its problems.

But it was exposed, in the end, a stark reminder that owning up and addressing problems is far better than taking the approach the miscreants initially chose.